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Abstract:  I study political competition between two candidates who could differ in their ability, popularity, and 
ethics.  In elections, each candidate proposes a flat (income) tax rate and a public good level.  A high(er)-ability 
candidate can produce the public good using less funds.  Collected taxes that are not used in public goods production 
are stolen by the elected politician.  The voting decision is probabilistic; it depends on a candidate's fiscal policy and 
his popularity.  I prove that the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists and that there are at most two separate 
equilibria.  I also provide a fully solved example. 
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 1 Introduction
The eﬀectiveness of an economic policy depends on both the objective and the con-
straints of the policy maker. Illustrating this point, a classical example is the welfare
eﬀects of broadening the tax base. When the tax rates are determined by a benevolent
dictator, broader tax bases reduce the deadweight loss and increase taxpayers’ welfare.
When, however, a Leviathan (a policy maker who cares only about his own consump-
tion and who does not face any competition) decides on the tax rates, broader tax
bases reduce taxpayers’ welfare, (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; and Wilson, 1989).
Consider a country in which a small group of career politicians repeatedly compete
with each other. Assume that in this country (at least some of) the politicians are
corrupt, and this is well known by (at least a large fraction of) the voters.1 How should
one model the objectives and the constraints of an elected leader in such a country?
Neither the benevolent dictator, nor its exact opposite, the Leviathan, would be an
appropriate model. These two models describe two polar cases, similar to the perfect
competition and the monopoly in the ﬁrm theory. Generalizing earlier work by Polo
(1998), I study a “duopoly” model of political agency. Although diﬀerent factors
may contribute to high level political corruption in diﬀerent countries, the model
emphasizes two of them: the limited number of competing politicians and candidate
heterogeneity.
When combined with candidate heterogeneity, the limited number of candidates
implies that a politician has “market power”. In other words, if the candidates are
not perfect substitutes from the point of view of voters, then a corrupt politician
can steal and still may get re-elected. For instance, a candidate who is known to
be more able than his rival can still remain competitive even when he engages in
corruption.2 Ability is not the only characteristics that the voters care about. Their
1See, for instance, the section on Elite Cartels in Johnston (2005)’s taxanomy of political corrup-
tion.
2In 1820s, John Randolph complained that his Congressional colleague, Henry Clay, “... is so
brilliant, so capable, and yet so corrupt that like a rotten mackerel in the moonlight, he both shines
1decision may be inﬂuenced by factors such as the candidate’s gender, ethnic origin,
family or tribe, religion, personal charisma or ideology. All these factors aﬀect a
candidate’s popularity. Further, a candidate’s popularity may be subject to random
shocks: many unforeseeable events (including scandals) that occur during a political
campaign aﬀect it. Due to this uncertainty about popularity, even a corrupt candidate
who faces an opponent with the same level of ability as well as the same level of ex
ante popularity has a chance to be re-elected.
To formalize these ideas, Section 2 presents a model of political competition under
probabilistic voting. In the model, there is a continuum of voters who diﬀer in their
income level. A voter’s utility is separable in the private and the public good con-
sumptions. Each of the two expected-rent-maximizing candidates announces a ﬁscal
policy platform: a tax rate and a public good level. Candidates keep their election
promises. A candidate can be pathologically honest, that is, he may not steal even if
he could receive a net expected monetary beneﬁt by doing so. Such a candidate may
still run in the elections because for every winning candidate there are legal rents:
ego rents and a salary. But, for those who are not pathologically honest, winning the
election provides the opportunity to steal. The amount a candidate steals is implicitly
deﬁned by the diﬀerence between tax revenues and public good costs where the costs
are determined by the candidate’s ability.
In the model, there are three types of constraints that would reduce, if not elimi-
nate, the incentives to steal: a candidate may have moral scruples; the voters, other
things being equal, prefer a clean candidate to a corrupt one; and ﬁnally, a corrupt
candidate may get caught and punished. The strength of these constraints, however,
vary depending on the political environment and the quality of institutions. So, what
happens in equilibrium depends on the parameters of the model.
I show that under all possible parameters, the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of
and stinks”,–quoted in Ehrenhalt (2002). More recently da Silva (2000) notes that Adhemar de
Barros, a three-time governor of Sao Paula, has been attributed to say, “I am an embezzler, but I
am also an accomplisher”.
2the model exists. When there are no legal penalties or when the expected penalties
are very severe, the equilibrium is unique. Otherwise, there can be at most two
distinct equilibria. I identify both the ﬁrst order conditions that characterize the
equilibrium level of corruption, and the relationship between the equilibrium ﬁscal
policy and the equilibrium level of corruption. Since the voters’ preferences, too, are
part of the parameter space, there is no closed form solution for the general model.
Still, the comparative statics from the general model can be used to study several
policy questions. For applications that require a closed form solution, a fully solved
example for the special case of quasi-linear voter preferences is provided in Appendix.
Political corruption all over the world shows more variation than a simple model
can explain. The model here emphasizes the role of limited number of competing can-
didates as well as (both ex-ante and ex-post) candidate heterogeneity; other models
of political agency emphasize other factors. For instance, in the seminal incumbency
model of Ferejohn (1986) and its extension and generalization in Besley and Smart
(2007) the source of political corruption is imperfect information.3 In these models,
the voter cannot observe how much, if at all, the incumbent steals; she tries to infer
it from his actions.
In countries in which there are suﬃciently many able and honest politicians, the
discovery (or even the rumor) of a past corrupt behavior would end a politician’s
career; as there are better alternatives, nobody would vote for him again. The in-
cumbency model in Besley and Smart (2007) would explain policy making in such
countries well. In the model I study here the voters may still vote for a politician
who is commonly considered as corrupt.4 This is because they have a limited number
3Moral hazard in the former and both moral hazard and adverse selection in the latter.
4An earlier example is Mayor Curley of Boston, see Beatty (2000). More recently, Little and
Herrera (1996, p. 268) note that in Venezuela, “the election of the second time of Carlos Andres
Perez, (ﬁrst presidency 1974-79) in 1988 suggested that most voters were more than happy with a
president who was widely believed to be corrupt, but who promised a return to the old days”. In
Brazil, following the suspension of the political rights of President Collor and several other politicians
after the corruption allegations, Martins (1996, p.196) wrote that “Nonethless, it would not be
surprising, if, at the end of the period of suspension of their political rights, they [Ex-president
Collor, the congressman and the senators] put themselves forward again as candidates and were
3of alternatives (only two), and the other alternative they have could be less able, or,
he may not be popular among the voters for other reasons (for instance, he does not
have the desirable characteristics such as ethnicity, gender, religion, looks, ideology,
etc.).
In the duopoly model, the equilibrium level of corruption is determined through
strategic interaction between candidates. This is due to the limited number of com-
peting candidates. Then, a change in a parameter such as salary results in both
a direct eﬀect and an indirect (strategic) eﬀect on equilibrium level of corruption.
This indirect eﬀect is absent from the models that assume a continuum of competing
candidates including the incumbency model.
In the duopoly model, the number of competing candidates is limited. Further,
there is no “entry”. When both candidates steal in equilibrium, one may wonder why
a better person does not run for the oﬃce; had this happen, the voters would “throw
the rascals out”. Caselli and Morelli (2004), and Myerson (1993, 2006), however, show
that free entry does not necessarily lead to a signiﬁcant improvement in the quality
of elected politicians. These authors, too, study models of political corruption in
which the voters know how corrupt the candidates are. In Caselli and Morelli (2004),
low legal rents explain the persistent low quality of political candidates: high quality
candidates do not run, since it is not worth it. Further, Caselli and Morelli (2004)
note that, once elected, the low quality candidates have incentives to keep the legal
rents low to prevent entry.
Myerson (1993, 2006) considers multiple candidates who diﬀer in their exogenous
policy platforms (left or right) and exogenous characteristics (honest or corrupt). He
shows that under many commonly voting rules (including plurality) the voters may
not be able to vote in a coordinated way to elect an honest candidate who adopts a
popular policy platform. Thus, the analysis in this paper complements the analysis
in Caselli and Morelli (2004), and Myerson (1993, 2006). They explain how corrupt
elected, as has occured in other cases of corruption”. Indeed, in 2006, Collor won %44 of the vote
and became a senator representing the Brazilian state Alagoas.
4politicians may survive in politics. I take it given that some politicians want to (and
may have the opportunity to) steal, and study the existence of political equilibrium
in such an environment.
In Section 3, I discuss the relation to earlier literature. Before me, both Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) and Polo (1998) note that politicians steal in Downsian compe-
tition when the vote shares are stochastic. Polo (1998) provides a formal model with
micro foundations and quasi-linear preferences. This paper extends and generalizes
Polo (1998) in a variety of directions. These extensions allow one to consider some
features of political competition that have important policy implications.
Finally, in Section 4, I discuss some of the modelling assumptions and future
extensions, then I conclude. An important modelling assumption is that political
competition is a one-shot game. The game I study, however, should be considered
as the stage game of repeated competition between two career politicians. Such an
interpretation justiﬁes the modelling assumption that even a corrupt candidate keeps
his election promises instead of stealing everything when elected.5
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of voters of measure one. Let Yi denote the income level of
voter i, and F(Yi) denote the cumulative density of Yi. Let us normalize the average
income,
R
YidF(Yi), to one. Assume that each voter pays an income tax at ﬂat rate
t and consumes the rest of his income, ci = (1−t)Yi. Collected taxes are available to
be used by the elected leader to produce a public good, g. For private consumption,
c, there is a single good sold an unit price. Each voter i’s preferences over goods are
represented by the following utility function:
5Evrenk (2008b) studies a dynamic but simpliﬁed version of this model, and proves that, as long
as the equilibrium rents and the candidates’ discount factors are not too low, a corrupt candidate
has incentives to keep his election promises.
5U(ci,g) = I(ci) + H(g). (1)
In (1), both I(.) and H(.) are strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous and
twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions from R+ to R. I assume that both I0(0)
and H0(0) converges to inﬁnity.
There are two competing candidates, j ∈ {1,2}. The timing of the game is as
follows: simultaneously each j announces a policy platform, a tax rate, tj, and a
public good level, gj. Then, the elections will be held. The winner of the election
always implements the policy that he announced. The winner produces the public
good from the available public funds using a linear technology that depends on his
(non-veriﬁable) ability, αj. The net public funds used in the production of public
good is equal to collected tax revenues minus the salary of the leader, w > 0, and an
amount that he chooses to steal, sj,
gj = (tj − w − sj)αj. (2)
Each candidate’s goal is to maximize his expected rents and each candidate’s
outside option is normalized to zero. In addition to salary, the winning candidate
receives ego rents, η, as well. Further, each candidate j knows that if he steals a
dollar from the public budget, a fraction, (1 − θj) > 0, is lost (the cost of stealing),
and he will appropriate only the rest of it. This assumption known as “leakage” or
“deadweight loss of corruption” in the literature reﬂects the possibility that the leader
should share the illegal rents with others or that there is a moral cost of stealing. The
second interpretation allows us to use θj to model honesty in a utility maximizing
setup by setting θj = 0, –such politicians are referred as “pathologically honest” in
Rose-Ackerman (2001).
In addition to the deadweight loss of corruption, a corrupt politician will get
caught and be punished with probability p > 0. Then, he will be deprived of his
6position, lose the legal rents w and η, and pay a legal penalty worth y + vsj, where
y > 0 and v > 0. Thus, when he is elected, j expects to receive
Rj(sj) = w + η + 1{sj>0}[θjsj − (vsj + y + w + η)p], (3)
where 1{sj>0} is equal to 1 if sj > 0, and equal to 0 otherwise.
The voting is probabilistic: i votes for j when U
j
i > Uk






i = I((1 − tj)Yi) + H(gj) + (j − 1)(β + β2 + βi2). (4)
The term β + β2 + βi2 in (4) captures the non–policy issues that aﬀect the voting
decision: β is the electorate’s average bias in favor of Candidate 2 and it is known
ex ante.6 From the candidates’ point of view, β2 and βi2 are independent random




2φ], where both 1
2σ and 1
2φ are
assumed to be suﬃciently large but ﬁnite. The ﬁrst term, β2, reﬂects a correlated
preference shock (such as the candidate’s performance on a televised debate just
before the elections; a scandal; an unexpected success or failure of a policy that the
candidate strongly defended in the past), while βi2 reﬂects an idiosyncratic shock on
individual i’s preferences. Let E[h(Yi)] denote
R
h(Y i)dF(Yi) for any function h(.),








Each candidate j chooses his equilibrium policy platform, (t∗
j,g∗
j), to maximize





6So, a positive (negative) β means Candidate 2 is more (less) popular ex-ante.
7To derive ρ1 note that U1
i > U2
i if and only if βi2 < U(c1
i,g1) − U(c2
i,g2) − β − β2. Then the
















j) is the ﬁrst-best policy platform that maximizes the voters’ expected welfare,
E[W]. It is straightforward to show that8





where k 6= j, and that the ﬁrst-best involves no corruption, g0
j = (t0
j − w)αj, with
t0
j = argmaxE[Ui((1 − tj)Yi,gj((tj − w)αj))].
To ﬁnd when the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, PSNE, policy platforms and
the ﬁrst-best policy platforms diﬀer, consider the ﬁrst order conditions (f.o.c.’s) from
each candidate’s optimization problem. The f.o.c. with respect to tax rate implies




∂tj = 0. Since w + η > 0, the candidate’s rents, Rj, has to
be strictly positive in equilibrium. Thus,
∂E[Ui(.)]
∂tj = 0. That is,
Lemma 1 In equilibrium each candidate chooses a tax rate that maximizes voters’
expected welfare given the amount he steals, sj.




j. (One can also show that there exists an equilibrium public good level
function, g∗
j(sj) = aj(t∗
j(sj) − w − sj) with g∗
j(0) = g0
j.) Due to our assumptions that
(i) candidates are rent-maximizing; (ii) voters are equally inﬂuential and equally well
informed (βi2 has the same support for all i); (iii) there are no special interest lobbies,
the agency problem exists, if at all, only when at least one j steals. To be able to
see when a candidate steals, below, I reframe the optimization problem: instead of
studying the optimal (tj,gj), I study the choice of optimal (tj,sj). That is to say, I
solve the model as if each candidate decides which tax rate to propose and how much
to steal. From the point of view of a candidate, there is no diﬀerence between these









i,gj) + (1 −
ρ1)[β + Eβ2[β2 | β2 < E[U(c1
i,g1) − U(c2
i,g2)] − β]]. Note that (1 − ρ1)Eβ2[β2 | β2 < E[U(c1
i,g1) −
U(c2
i,g2)]−β] is equal to 1
2σ[1
4 −(ρ1 − 1









2)2]. Summing over i and using the deﬁnition of ρj we have the desired result.
8two problems: for a given tj, choosing gj is the same as choosing sj (and, vice-versa).
This change of variables simpliﬁes the analysis, because, now the relevant strategy
space is reduced into a curve, t∗






(aj)2H00((tj − w − sj)αj)
E[Y 2





dsj ∈ (0,1), i.e., political corruption is ﬁnanced by both ineﬃciently high
taxes and ineﬃciently low public good levels.
Taking the derivative of ρjRj with respect to sj, we obtain the second f.o.c.,
σRj
∂[H((tj − w − sj)αj)]
∂sj
+ (θj − pv)ρj ≤ 0 (with equality when s
∗
j > 0). (6)
Note that,
∂ρjRj
∂sj is equal to a weighted average of two marginal gains: (i) the average
marginal disutility of voters from corruption (weighted by σRj), and (ii) the marginal
increase in rents due to corruption (weighted by the probability that j will have the
opportunity to receive these rents). Also note that ρj (and, thus,
∂ρjRj
∂sj ) depends on sk.
Let s
p
j(sk) denote the best response correspondence of candidate j when probability
of getting caught is p. Next, I examine whether s
p
j(sk)’s intersect with each other.
2.1 PSNE when there is no penalty, p = 0
Let us ﬁrst consider the special case with no legal penalty for corruption, p = 0. This
case is considerably easier to solve; it helps one to see how the electoral competition
shapes the equilibrium policy.10
Lemma 2 When p = 0, over (t∗
j(sj),sj),
∂ρjRj
∂sj is (i) continuous and strictly decreas-
9To ﬁnd the slope, diﬀerentiate
∂E[Ui(.)]
∂tj = 0 with respect to sj.
10Moreover, the assumption that there is no penalty may not be completely unrealistic: one can
think of countries in which eﬀectively there is no legal penalty for corruption, (or, of leaders who
behave as if they live in such a country.)
9ing (so, the objective function, ρjRj, is strictly quasi-concave) in sj, (ii) continuous
and strictly increasing in sk. Further, stealing everything is never optimal for a cor-
rupt candidate, i.e., limsj→tj−w(
∂ρjRj
∂sj ) = −∞
Lemma 2 has three implications about the (shape of the) best response correspon-
dences: parts (i) and (ii), when combined with the Theorem of Maximum, imply that
s0




∂sj |sj=0 < 0, then s0
j(sk) = 0 for any sk < s0
k. Third, the last part
of Lemma 2 shows that s0
j(sk) is always bounded from above, i.e., s0
j(sk) < 1 − w.
The last part of Lemma 2 also implies that when j steals, his expected rents as
a function of sj has an inverse-U shape: they ﬁrst increase and then decrease. An
inverse-U shaped revenue curve (the Ibn Khaldun-Keynes-Laﬀer curve) is used to
explain interior equilibrium tax rates in another, Leviathan, model of government.
There are, however, some important diﬀerences.
First, the source of each curve is diﬀerent. Although the Leviathan receives a
constant fraction of total tax revenue, he does not impose a hundred percent (income)
tax. This is because the elasticity of tax base with respect to tax rate (the wage
elasticity of labor supply) is considerably high: after a certain point a one percent
increase in (income) tax rate reduces the total tax revenue. In contrast, in our model
no condition on the elasticity of tax base is required: in our model, a taxpayer’s
income, Yi, is perfectly inelastic with respect to tax rate. What derives an interior
optimum in the duopoly model is political competition.11 Second, the relationship
between the tax revenue and illegal rents are diﬀerent. In the duopoly model the
illegal rents are not a ﬁxed proportion of the total tax revenue. Thus reducing the
total tax revenue (for instance, by imposing constitutional constraints on the size of
the public budget) does not always reduce corruption, see Evrenk (2008a, Example
1). Third, the way the curve is determined is diﬀerent: in Leviathan model, there
11The assumption that the marginal utility of private good consumption is very high when the
quantity of good consumed is very low also helps: even when k imposes hundred percent taxes (and
steals all the tax revenue), by stealing a little bit less than that, j can increase ρj signiﬁcantly.
10is only one curve. in our model, when both candidates steal, each candidate has
an expected revenue curve. More important, the relevant curve will be determined
through the strategic interaction between the candidates. To see why, ﬁrst note that
in the duopoly model the corruption levels of candidates are strategic complements.
Lemma 3 If candidate j’s best response to a certain level of sk is to steal, s0
j(sk) > 0,




The best response function picks the sj that maximizes ρjRj for a given sk. Lemma
3 shows that if for a given sk, candidate j steals (faces an inverse-U shaped expected
rents curve), then for any s0
k > sk he steals more (he faces another such curve, and
that the latter curve has a higher peak than the ﬁrst one has).
When j does not steal, his expected rents are not inverse-U shaped; they de-
crease in sj. Then, his best response is not to steal. Thus, if we know the shape of
his expected rents curve, we can ﬁgure out the shape of his best-response function.
There are only three possibilities: (i) the expected rents are always inverse-U shaped
(
∂ρjRj
∂sj |sj=0 > 0 at sk = 0), i.e., s0
j(sk) is strictly positive on all its domain; (ii) the
expected rents are always decreasing (
∂ρjRj
∂sj |sj=0 < 0 at sk = 1 − w), i.e., s0
j(sk) is
ﬂat on all its domain; and (iii) the expected rents are decreasing if the rival does not
steal much, and they have an inverse-U shape if the rival candidate steals more that
a certain amount (
∂ρjRj
∂sj |sj=0 < 0 at sk = 0, but
∂ρjRj
∂sj |sj=0 > 0 at sk = 1 − w), i.e.,
s0
j(sk) = 0 up to a certain level of sk, say e sk > 0, and s0
j(sk) > 0 for any sk > e sk.
Unless s0
j(sk) is ﬂat at least for one candidate, there may be an interior equilibrium.
The following property limits the number of interior equilibria.
Lemma 4 If the best response functions intersect at the interior, (s∗
1,s∗
2) ∈ (0,1−w)2,
in (s1,s2) space, then at the point of intersection s0










Figure 1 helps us to see the implications of Lemma 4 on the number of interior
equilibria. In all panels of Figure 1, the darker (lighter) curve is the best response
11Figure 1: Lemma 4 implies that the equilibria in panels b, c, and d are not possible.
(In all graphs, the darker curve is Candidate 1’s best-response function.)
function for Candidate 1 (Candidate 2). In panel (a), the condition in Lemma 4 is
satisﬁed at the single intersection point.
Panel (b) helps us to see that we cannot have inﬁnitely many interior equilibria.
Because, in that case, the best response functions must be tangent to each other over









all of these intersection points, they would violate the condition in Lemma 4. Panel (c)
helps us to see that in the interior even ﬁnitely many multiple equilibria is not possible.









∂s2 )−1 holds at the ﬁrst and the third intersections, yet it









the best response functions are continuous and increasing in the interior, between
















∂s2 )−1. Thus, as I formally prove in Appendix,
Proposition 1 When p = 0, there can be at most one interior PSNE.
Since the best response functions are continuous both in the interior and in the
boundary, the same idea can be extended to any intersection of the best response func-
tions, see panel (d) in Figure 1. Further, using the Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem,
one can show that the best response functions do intersect at least once. Combining
this with Proposition 1, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 When p = 0, the PSNE of the political competition game exists and
it is unique.
2.2 PSNE when there is a penalty, p > 0
When p > 0 the analysis is more complicated. Because, then, the objective function
has an upward jump at sj = 0, that is, limsj↓0 ρj(sj,sk)Rj(sj) < ρj(0,sk)Rj(0). When
the objective function is discontinuous, the best response function is not necessarily





Rj(sj) for sj > 0,
limsj↓0 Rj(sj) at sj = 0.
(30)
The only diﬀerence between Rj(sj) and rj(sj) is that the latter is continuous ev-
erywhere where the former is discontinuous at zero. Now, consider a fake objective
function: ρj(sj,sk)rj(sj). This function is strictly quasi-concave and continuous in
sj, continuous in sk, and more important it is equal to ρj(sj,sk)Rj(sj) everywhere
except at sj = 0.
13Next, we derive a fake best response function: let f
p
j (sk) denote the argument of
maximum of ρj(sj,sk)rj(sj). Note that the upward jump in the objective function at
sj = 0 implies that the candidate will not steal a trivial amount.12 It does not imply
that the candidate will always stay honest. When p > 0 stealing a trivial amount is













j (sk)) > ρj(0,sk)Rj(0) and f
p






j(sk),sk) = 0 is necessary but not suﬃcient for s
p
j (sk) > 0, al-
though it is both necessary and suﬃcient for f
p
j (sk) > 0. Also note that, as the
following Lemma shows there is no hole in s
p
j (sk) when it is equal to f
p
j (sk):




j (sk) > 0, then for any s0









j (sk) is not equal to f
p
j (sk), then, by construction, s
p
j (sk) is equal to zero.
Thus, s
p
j (sk) cannot have a discontinuity when it is equal to zero either. Then, the









j (sk) if sk > sk
0 otherwise.
In this formulation sk is the point at which the best response function may be discon-




j (sk)) = ρj(0,sk)Rj(0). Only when
sk ∈ (0,1 − w), the best response function is discontinuous.
The function f
p
j (sk) is similar to s0
j (sk) in the sense that it comes from the maxi-
mization of a continuous and strictly quasi-concave objective function over a convex
domain. Thus we can apply Lemmas 2, 3, 4 as well as Proposition 1: f
p
j (sk)’s are
single valued, continuous in sk, strictly increasing in the interior, with at most one
12Intuitively, in this case no matter how much he has stolen, a corrupt politician, when caught,
will loose rents worth y + w + η, (the constant penalty and the legal rents). So, stealing any less
than (y + w + η)p makes no sense.
13For instance, when both (y,p,v) and (w,η) are small.
14possible intersection in the interior. Thus, when p > 0, still, there can be at most one
interior equilibrium.
Note that the best response function does not have to be discontinuous even when
p > 0: it is possible that the penalties are so eﬀective (ineﬀective) that a candidate
never (always) steals no matter how much his rival steals. Then, the structure is
isomorphic to that with p = 0, and the game has a unique PSNE. When there is
a discontinuity in at least one candidate’s best response function, the best response
functions may intersect both at the boundary and in the interior. In both parts the
function is continuous, so the intersection is unique. Thus, in this case we may have
two equilibria.
Proposition 3 When there are legal penalties for corruption, the PSNE always ex-
ists. In this case, however, the game may have (at most) two distinct equilibria.
In one of these equilibria both candidates steal, and in the other one at most one
candidate steals.
2.3 Equilibrium outcomes and applications
There are three possible equilibrium outcomes: both candidates steal, CC; only one
candidate steals, HC; and no agency problem (none of the candidates steal), HH.
Using the fact that the best response functions are non-decreasing, we can deﬁne
the conditions that lead to each type of outcome, see also Appendix 5.2. Since
incorporated into our model I(.) and H(.) are also parts of the parameter space,
these conditions do not give rise to closed form solutions or explicit conditions on the
parameters of the model. For example, it is straightforward to show that when p = 0,
the unique equilibrium outcome is HH if and only if s0
j(0) < 0 for both candidates; CC
if and only if (i) s0
j(0) > 0 for at least one j and (ii) for k 6= j, we have s0
k(s0
j(0)) > 0;
and HC (only j steals) if and only if s0
j(0) > 0 but s0
k(s0
j(0)) = 0. But, the key
condition, s0


















Although we do not have closed form solutions, one can still apply the model to study
several ﬁscal policy issues using the ﬁrst order conditions.14 For HC, the comparative
statics are straightforward: generically when there is an inﬁnitesimal change in one
of the parameters of the model, only the corrupt candidate’s policy platform change,
and this change can easily be calculated by applying the Implicit Function Theorem
on the ﬁrst order conditions for this candidate,–both before and after the change, the
other candidate proposes (t0
j,g0
j).
To calculate the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal change in a parameter, say κ, on s∗
j’s when
both candidates steal, one needs to diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst order conditions,
∂ρjRj
∂sj = 0,












































Using equation (7) from the proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix, Lemma 4 can be
rewritten as,









is less than zero.
Since it shows that the determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix above is always
negative, Corollary 1 considerably simpliﬁes calculations for the comparative statics
and it is very useful for applications.
14For instance, Evrenk (2008a) studies the (in)eﬀectiveness of three commonly discussed anti-
corruption policies (constitutional constraints, wage reform, and higher penalties). To calculate the
eﬀects of each policy, I ﬁrst ﬁx the type of the equilibrium outcome. Then, I calculate the eﬀect of
a change in the parameter that will be aﬀected by each policy on the equilibrium corruption levels
s∗




j)) on voters welfare, E[W].
16To calculate the comparative statics in CC one needs to use the f.o.c.’s for both
candidates because when both candidates steal, a change in a given parameter results
in both a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect (on equilibrium level of corruption and
on ﬁscal policy). The indirect eﬀect is due to strategic interaction between the candi-
dates, and, thus, it cannot be captured by most of the other commonly used agency
models which assume a continuum of competing candidates implying no strategic
interaction between them.15 To see the diﬀerence between these two eﬀects, let us
calculate the eﬀect of a marginal increase in salary on equilibrium level of corruption
in both HC and CC (which I denote below by sHC
2 and sCC
2 ). To simplify the calcu-
lations, assume that the candidates are identical in both cases, except in the former,
Candidate 1 is pathologically honest, θ1 = 0. Following the steps described above,





(θ2 − pv)[H0(gHC) − H0(g0)] + (1 − pv)H0(gHC) − RHC
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2 ) − w − sCC
2 )α, and g0 is the
ﬁrst-best public good level. To be able to compare the eﬀects, let us assume that the














is, the wage increase is more eﬀective in reducing Candidate 2’s equilibrium level of
corruption when both candidates steal.17 In HC, the wage increase has only a direct
eﬀect: when the legal rents increase, the oﬃce becomes more attractive. Then, to
15Such as Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Besley and Smart (2007), and Caselli and Morelli (2006).





2 , the probability that the corrupt
candidate wins in HC, is equal to 1
2 + σHC(E[I((1 − t∗
2(sHC















dw + ∆, where
17increase the probability that he wins, the candidate proposes a better policy platform
(he steals less). In CC, however, there is an indirect eﬀect as well. The oﬃce becomes
equally more attractive, yet, this is true for Candidate 1 as well: the wage increase
reduces s∗
1 too. Thus, to increase the probability that he wins the election, Candidate
2 needs to reduce s∗
2 further. Note that the indirect eﬀect is possible only when there
is strategic interaction among candidates; when each candidate takes into account
the other’s level of corruption when deciding how much to steal.
In the general model, it is not possible to calculate the relative size of each eﬀect.
Using examples, one can show that the indirect eﬀect can be large and that it can
have important policy implications, see Evrenk (2008a). It is also worth noting that
these two eﬀects do not need to have the same sign, (consider for instance an increase
in the candidate’s popularity).
In some applications one may need to compare two distinct equilibria. Then,
comparative statics are not useful.18 For such applications, a fully solved example
for U(c,g) = c + 2γ
√
g is provided in Appendix. Although studying quasi-linear
preferences allows one to obtain closed form solutions, as I discuss in the next section,
these preferences have strong implications on equilibrium outcome.
3 Relation to previous literature
Using models of two candidate competition, Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Polo
(1998), and Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that when there is (i) uncertainty
∆ =
(θ2 − pv)H0(g∗)[H0(g∗)((θ2 + 1 − 2pv) − (θ2 − pv)H0(g0)] − (1 − pv)H0(g∗)R∗
2H00(g∗
2)α





is positive as both the nominator and denominator are positive.
18For instance, Evrenk (2008b) examines under which conditions (both corrupt and honest)
politicians oppose anti-corruption reforms. When a politician decides whether to support an anti-
corruption reform or not, he compares his gain (more votes in the current election) and his loss
(lower rents in future) due to reform. So, to determine when a candidate supports the reform, one
needs to calculate equilibrium rents before the reform (in HC or CC) and after the reform in (HH).
18about the voter preferences, (ii) candidate heterogeneity, and (iii) low legal rents,
politicians will steal despite repeated elections. They emphasize the ineﬀectiveness of
repeated elections in constraining politicians. The purpose of this paper is to provide
a model for policy analysis when repeated elections are not eﬀective. In this section,
I ﬁrst show that the ﬁndings of the earlier studies can be considered as applications
of this model in special environments. Then, I discuss what one gains by considering
the more general model in this paper.
Lemma 6 Consider an sk to which j’s best response is to steal, s
p
j(sk) > 0. Any of the
following would increase s
p
j(sk): (i) an increase in the uncertainty about popularity,
1
σ, (ii) an increase in the expected popularity of candidate, 2(j − 3
2)β, (iii) a decrease
in the ability of the rival candidate, αk, and, (iv) a decrease in ego rents, η.
Proof. When s
p
j(sk) > 0, we have
∂ρjRj
∂sj = 0. Applying the Implicit Function
Theorem to this equality, the above results are obtained.
To my knowledge, Geoﬀrey Brennan and James Buchanan are the ﬁrst ones to
note that when there is aggregate uncertainty about vote shares, each of the two
Downsian candidates have incentives to steal. Brennan and Buchanan (1980, p.27)
provides an example: consider two politicians and three voters where each politician
simultaneously proposes a policy on how to distribute $300 among the three voters
(if the total money allocated to the voters is less than $300, then, he pockets the
diﬀerence). Each voter and each politician cares only about how much money he
will receive. The policy that receives two (out of the three) votes from voters will
be implemented. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) note that a PSNE for this game
does not exist: each candidate will have to propose a probabilistic policy. They do
not calculate the mixed strategy equilibrium,19 but rather they note that when each
candidate’s vote share is a stochastic function of his policy platform (as in a mixed
19Although the example is simple, to calculate the mixed strategy equilibrium is quite diﬃcult.
Recently, Szentes and Rosenthal (2003) study an isomorphic game and show that each player’s
equilibrium mixed strategy is characterized by the uniform density on the surface of a regular
tetrahedra.
19strategy equilibrium) “each party would rationally appropriate some of the $300.” (p.
27).20
The analysis in Section 2 generalizes Polo (1998) who provides a formal agency
model that allows one to study the relationship between the aggregate uncertainty
about the vote shares and the incentives to steal. The diﬀerences are that in Polo
(1998) there is no punishment for stealing, no ability diﬀerences between candidates,
no deadweight loss of corruption (all candidates are fully corrupt, θj = 1) and the
voters’ preferences are quasilinear, I(c) = c. As Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Polo
(1998), too, assumes that there is no legal rents. He, too, ﬁnds that both candidates
always steal in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Polo (1998)) Suppose that
candidates are identical, (α1 = α2, β = 0), are not pathologically honest, (θ > 0), that
there are no legal rents, (w = η = 0) and no punishment, p = 0. If there is aggregate
uncertainty about vote shares, ( 1
σ > 0), then both candidates steal in the equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result is that when there are no wages or ego rents,
the only source of rents is corruption. Then, a candidate wants to win, only if he
can steal after winning. Thus, a candidate who does not face any other (legal, or
moral) constraints, steals. Note that if there are no legal rents, then, even the severe
penalties cannot eliminate the agency problem: severe penalties guarantee that the
candidate will not steal, but they do not guarantee that the candidate will choose the
ﬁrst-best policy.21
To my knowledge, Polo (1998) is also the ﬁrst one to study how candidate hetero-
geneity aﬀects a candidate’s incentives to steal. Polo (1998, Lemma 2) shows that the
agency problem may stem from popularity diﬀerences even when there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty about vote shares. There is a technical problem with the existence
20Brennan and Buchanan (1980) does not pursue this example further. After noting that the
Downsian competition is not always enough to restrain politicians, they model the state as a mono-
lithic entity, Leviathan, and discuss the eﬀectiveness of several ﬁscal policies using the monopoly
model of government.
21That is, when Rj cannot exceed zero, Lemma 1 does not hold.
20of the equilibrium in this case, so assume that (i) each i votes for the more popular
candidate when U2
i = U1
i , and (ii) there are N voters, where N is a very large odd
number, for the following example.22
Example 1: Assume that α1 = α2, θ1 = θ2, p = 0, 1
σ = 0, and β > 0 but very
small. Then in equilibrium, the popular candidate always steals. To see why, note
that since both candidates have the same ability, the ﬁrst-best policy is the same for
them. So, when Candidate 2 proposes the ﬁrst-best policy, he wins for sure. Yet,
Candidate 2 can aﬀord to steal; if he steals the amount that is implicitly deﬁned by
E[U2
i (t2,g2)] + β = E[U1
i (t0,g0)], then he wins certainly. Thus, greater popularity
allows a candidate to steal.
Polo’s observation helps explain the paradox that some corrupt politicians are also
quite popular: politicians are not popular because they are corrupt, but rather that
popular politicians can aﬀord to be corrupt. This result can be extended to the other
type of comparative advantages: such incentives still exist when the politicians diﬀer
not in terms of their popularity but in their ability or both.
In their survey of agency models, Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 71) discuss a
model based on Polo (1998), but they consider ego rents as well.23 They show that the
(identical) candidates steal in equilibrium only when the ego rents are low, η < θ
2σ.
Below, Proposition 5 shows that Persson and Tabellini (2000)’s conclusion on the
eﬀects of legal rents still holds in the more general version.24
Proposition 5 (Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.73)) When the candidates are
identical, they steal if and only if (w+η)(1−p) < py+(θ−pv)( 1
2σαH0(α(t(s)−w−s)) −s).
22Technically, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies (neither in the model of Polo (1998) nor in
our model) when 1
σ = 0 and β 6= 0. Yet, these two assumptions restore the existence of equilibrium.
(Polo (1998) notes the same problem. The solution he suggests is to discretize the strategy space.)
23Another diﬀerence is that in Polo (1998) all voters have the same income, where Persson and
Tabellini (2000) consider an electorate composed of three diﬀerent income groups.
24When p = 0, we have s = 0. If in addition, w = 0, then the condition in Proposition 5 is reduced
to η < θ
2σ.
21Uncertainty, candidate heterogeneity, and legal rents all aﬀect the incentives for
political corruption. However, their interaction is not always straightforward. For
instance, the conclusion about the role of the uncertainty in Persson and Tabellini
(2000, p.73), “...the crux of generating positive rents is thus the uncertainty about the
electoral competition...,” should not be interpreted as whenever one adds uncertainty
into the model, the level of political corruption increases. Quite the opposite, with
heterogenous candidates, aggregate uncertainty is sometimes necessary to stop cor-
ruption. To see why, consider again the setup in Example 1, but this time speciﬁcally
assume that the legal rents are very high. Note that as long as there is no uncertainty
about voter loyalty, Candidate 2 has incentives to steal no matter how high the legal
rents are. Because, still, greater popularity permits a candidate to steal more without
making himself inferior to the other candidate. Yet, in this case, if there exists some
(but, not too much) uncertainty about Candidate 2’s popularity,25 then Candidate
2 cannot guarantee a victory with the policy in Example 1. Further, if the size of
the aggregate uncertainty is large enough he cannot guarantee winning the election
even when he adopts the ﬁrst-best policy. Then, he proposes the ﬁrst-best policy
platform to increase the probability that he gets elected (and thus receives the high
legal rents).
I consider a more general framework because the setup used in earlier models
would give rise to some unrealistic policy recommendations when used for policy
analysis.26 For instance both Polo (1998), and Persson and Tabellini (2000) assume
quasi-linear preferences. When voter preferences are quasi-linear, the best response




2 in the interior. Then, the existence and




the only eﬀect of corruption is excessive tax rates; the equilibrium public good levels
25More formally, when p = 0, what we need is s0
2(0) ≤ 0 (and when p > 0, the condition f
p
2(0) ≤ 0
would be suﬃcient). This condition is equivalent to ((w + η)αH0((t0 − w)α) − βθ)σ < θ
2.
26Note, once again, that these earlier studies do not claim that they present models for policy
analysis. Their emphasis is on the result that under certain conditions repeated elections are not
enough to deter corruption.
22are always optimal. As I note following (5), when both I(.) and H(.) are strictly
concave, political corruption aﬀects both components of the ﬁscal policy.27
As I discuss in Section 3, when one considers legal penalties, there may be two
PSNE. The legal penalties have implications on the eﬀectiveness of other policies as
well. Evrenk (2008a) ﬁnds that when there are no legal penalties, higher salaries are
always eﬀective when both candidates steal. In a setup with legal penalties, however,
this is not always true.
Another dimension that this paper diﬀers from the earlier ones is that I consider
candidates who may diﬀer not only in their popularity but also in their ability. The
assumption that the candidates have the same level of ability, too, has strong policy
implications. Under this assumption, the diﬀerences in observed policy platforms has
to come from corruption. That is, in equilibrium a candidate proposes a higher tax
rate or a lower public good then his rival does only because he steals the diﬀerence.
Then, punishing the candidate who proposes a smaller public good level, or a larger
tax rate, would always be welfare increasing.
Finally I consider candidates who may face diﬀerent costs of corruption. This
diﬀerence allows one to study the eﬀectiveness of policies when one of the candidates
is (pathologically) honest, (as well as when it is relatively easier for one candidate
to steal). Evrenk (2008a) shows that such diﬀerences, too, have policy implications:
a salary reform that would be welfare-increasing when both candidates are corrupt
may reduce voters’ welfare when only one candidate is corrupt.
27Polo (1998, Proposition 6) notes that the model he studies has this unrealistic prediction. He
also notes that the equilibrium public good level is not optimal when one assumes non-separable
preferences. However, to study the model with general non-separable preferences is quite diﬃcult.
He, for instance, does not discuss the issues of existence and the uniqueness for this case. As
Proposition 2 shows, with separable, but not quasi-linear voter preferences, the PSNE still exists
and it is still unique for the case Polo (1998) studies.
234 Discussion and Conclusion
I study a duopoly model of political agency, describing competition among a small
group of career politicians who may diﬀer from each other in ability, popularity and
honesty. Voters care about a candidate’s ability in producing the public good; be-
cause, it aﬀects the cost of the public good. But, they also care about some candidate
characteristics that are orthogonal to ﬁscal policy. Then, from the point of view of
voters, the candidates are not perfect substitutes. This gives candidates some type of
a “market power”. Then, depending on the candidate’s comparative advantage, his
morals, the extend of the uncertainty about the voters’ preferences, and the eﬀective-
ness of legal penalties, a candidate may steal. Although the model includes several
relevant features of political competition, the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists
and the game may have at most two distinct equilibria.
I made some simplifying assumption. For instance, in the model, the probability
that a corrupt politician will be punished, p, is independent of the amount he stole,
sj. The idea is that a corrupt leader may get caught as a result of an oﬃcial audit
(although, in countries with widespread corruption this is not very likely) or as a result
of a scandal. In general, the probability that either of these will occur may depend on
sj. It is not clear, however, whether the probability that he will be punished increase
in sj: as sj increases, j becomes more powerful, and he can aﬀord to buy more allies
both in judiciary and in press. Then, the probability that he will be punished may
decrease in sj. Since it is not clear how p would change in sj, and since a constant
p simpliﬁes the analysis considerably, I simplify the model by assuming that p does
not change in the level of corruption.
I assume that when he wins, a corrupt candidate keeps his election promises.
Given that the election occurs only once in our model, one may wonder, why a corrupt
candidate does not steal all he can when he can. The one period game studied here
should be considered as the stage game of a dynamic model with reputation. Evrenk
(2008b) studies a simpliﬁed but inﬁnitely repeated version of this game and proves
24that as long as the present value of the future rents of a corrupt candidate is not too
low, he has incentives to keep his election promises.
Finally, I note that a corrupt candidate may need to share his illegal rents with
others, θj < 1, but I do not model the complicated multi-person bargaining that would
occur between the politician and the other actors (the businessman, the middleman,
the members of judiciary) involved in political corruption. Without modelling this
complicated bargaining part, one may still consider a model in which j decides how
many public contracts to award to his friends. Then, j knows that these friends charge
the government the competitive price plus a “mark-up”, and to thank this proﬁtable
opportunity they transfer a fraction of their proﬁt to j’s account in a foreign bank
that. This version of the model may seem closer to the actual corruption in several
countries, but (unless one models the interaction between the politician and the other
actors) the structure, and thus the results, would be identical to the model studied
here.28
Both the ﬁscal policy and equilibrium level of corruption are determined endoge-
nously in the model, so it can be used to study several policy issues.29 Evrenk (2008a
and 2008b) provide some applications of this model. It can also be considered as a
model of candidate eﬀort, where sj denotes shirking. Then, it can be used to study
the supervision of a utility maximizing bureaucracy by politicians as in Svensson
(2000).
In this paper I assume that the voters are equally inﬂuential and equally well
informed, that there are no special interest lobbies, and that candidates do not have
any policy preferences. Under these assumptions, a candidate does not adopt the
ﬁrst-best policy only when he steals. It is well known that political corruption is not
the only reason for ineﬃcient policies. By removing some of these assumptions, one
may study the equilibrium when there several reasons for ineﬃcient policies coexist.
28Except, in the alternative model there would be more parameters.
29Besley (2006) provides several examples of policy issues that one can study using an agency
model.
25Such extensions seems especially feasible as these issues, too, has been studied using
the same framework that I use here: two-candidate simultaneous move competition
with probabilistic voting.30 These extensions are left for future research.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs




∂gj is continuous in both tj and sj.
When p = 0, Rj(sj) is continuous in sj as well. Also note that when sj increases,







∂gj increases, thus the
objective function is quasi-concave.
For (ii), simply note that E[U(ck
i,gk)] and thus ρj is continuous in sk with
∂ρj
∂sk =
−H0((tk − w − sk)αk)σαk < 0.
Finally, note that
∂[H((tj−w−sj)αj)]
∂sj = −H0((tj−w−sj)αj). Thus, limsj→tj−w(
∂ρjRj
∂sj ) =
−∞ directly follows from our assumption that H0(0) converges to inﬁnity.
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix sk. If s0

























where zjk = θjαk
∂E[U(ck
i ,gk)]









(∂g)2 < 0. Finally, (5) implies that
∂t∗
j(sj)












∂sj )−1. Then by (7), we should have
zjkzkj
4zjjzkk+Z ≥ 1 where zjkzkj = zjjzkk and Z ≥ 0. Contradiction.




30Such studies include policy formation when there are lobbies (Baron, 1994; Grossman and
Helpman 1994, 2001); equilibrium ﬁscal policy when voters diﬀer in their inﬂuence and the elasticity
of taxable income, (Warskett, Hettich, and Winer 1998); and ﬁscal policy when policymakers have
(partisan) preferences over the ﬁscal policy (Roemer, 2001).
26deﬁned everywhere in the interior. Second, note that for each j, s0
j(sk) is a continuous
function. Assume that s0
j(sk)’s, which are increasing in the interior, intersect more








∂sj ≥ 1 in
one of these intersections. Contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Each s0
j (sk) is continuous and maps [0,1 − w] to itself.
Thus, by Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
For uniqueness ﬁrst note that by Proposition 1, we know that there is at most one
interior equilibrium. The idea behind Proposition 1 can be extended to intersections
at the boundary, but we ﬁrst need to show that s0
j(sk) is diﬀerentiable at the boundary.
When s0
j(sk) > 0 everywhere, or when s0
j(sk) = 0 everywhere, it is diﬀerentiable
everywhere, (in the ﬁrst case this follows from the Implicit Function Theorem, and
in the second case it is simply because
∂s0
j(sk)
∂sk = 0 everywhere. But if e sk ∈ (0,1 − w),
then s0
j(sk) may have a kink at e sk (we can use the Implicit Function Theorem for
sk > e sk, and we know that s0
j(sk) = 0 for sk < e sk, but at at e sk nothing guarantees
that the directional (one-sided) derivatives are equal to each other). Nevertheless, we
can still sign the directional derivatives at e sk: the right-sided derivative (derived from
∂ρjRj
∂sj = 0) is strictly positive, and the left-sided derivative (when
∂ρjRj
∂sj < 0) is zero.
To establish uniqueness, we ﬁrst note that there cannot be more than one corner
equilibria. Since the best response functions are bounded from above, if a corner
equilibrium exists, then this should be an equilibrium in which at least one candidate
does not steal. If neither candidates steal, the slope of each best response function is
zero with respect to diﬀerent axes, so they can intersect at most once. And if only
one candidate, say j, steals, then at the equilibrium s0
j(sk) > 0. Then, Lemma 3
implies that s0
j(sk) does not go back to the boundary. Thus, we cannot have more
than one corner equilibrium.
Lastly, I claim that the game cannot have both a corner equilibrium and a
strictly interior equilibrium. To see why, suppose that there exist one corner equi-






∂sj = 0. In the non-generic case, where both reaction functions have non-






∂sj < 1 (where I consider the right






∂sj < 1. In the non-generic case, both reaction functions are diﬀerentiable
between the two equilibria, thus the intuition behind Proposition 1 applies. That is,
for two such equilibria to exist, there should be a second interior equilibrium between
the corner equilibrium and the interior equilibrium, and at that second interior equi-






∂sj ≥ 1. This, however, contradicts Lemma 4. In
the generic case, as we discuss above
∂sj(sk)
∂sk may not be deﬁned at e sk. However, since
this is a boundary point and since we have shown that there cannot be two corner
equilibria, whether the derivative exists at this point or not does not matter. As
long as the reaction function is continuous, one can apply the same argument that we
provided for the non-generic case. Thus, when p = 0, there is a unique equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5. We need to show that s
p
j (sk) = f
p
j (sk) for some sk with
f
p







k)Rj(0) for any s0
k > sk.




j (sk)) ≥ ρj(0,sk)Rj(0). Let us note that both
sides are continuously diﬀerentiable in sk and consider an inﬁnitesimal increase. The
























0. Thus, we need to show that l − r > 0. Note that f
p






j (sk)) + (θj − pv)ρj(f
p








j (sk),sk)]. Staying honest would increase the probability of winning the
election, i.e., ρj(f
p




j (sk)) ≥ ρj(0,sk)Rj(0)
implies that Rj(f
p
j (sk)) > Rj(0). Hence l − r > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. As we discuss in Section 3.2, s
p
j(sk)’s can intersect at most
once in the interior. Similarly, one can show that there can be at most one corner
equilibrium, (and, by deﬁnition, in this corner equilibrium at most one candidate
28steals). The only diﬀerence occurs when the best response function is discontinuous.
In this case, there can be both a corner and an interior equilibria: following a corner
equilibrium in which, say, s
p
2(s1) is steeper than s
p
1(s2), the game may have an interior
equilibrium in which again s
p
2(s1) is steeper than s
p
1(s2). This is because at the point
of discontinuity s
p




1(s2) may jump above s
p
2(s1). Thus,











Proof of Proposition 4. Under the above conditions, Rj = θsj. Then, the marginal
expected rents from stealing is positive even when the other candidate does not steal,
∂ρjRj
∂sj |sj=0,sk=0 = θ
2 > 0. Thus, in the (unique) equilibrium both candidates steal.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that in symmetric case, both candidates steal in
equilibrium (s∗ > 0) if and only if sp(s) > s. Since (6) holds with equality at s∗ > 0,
this condition can be written as (w +η)(1−p) < py +(θ −pv)( 1
2σαH0(α(t(s)−w−s) −s).
5.2 A fully solved example with quasi-linear preferences
Assume that U(c,g) = c+2γ
√
g where γ > (min{α1,α2})− 3
2. Let ∆j = γ2(αj −αk)+
2(j− 3
2)β denote the relative advantage of Candidate j, and let λ
p
j denote the amount
of illegal rents that are payoﬀ equivalent to Candidate j’s legal rents when probability




θj−pv . Since quasi-linear preferences do not
satisfy our assumption that I0(0) converges to inﬁnity, stealing everything could be a
best response, –the last part of the Lemma 2 does not need to apply. To rule out an
equilibrium outcome with hundred percent taxes, I assume that neither the overall
uncertainty nor one candidate’s relative advantage is too high. More formally, for
each j ∈ {1,2}, we have 3
4σ+2∆j +γ2(αj +αk)−(w+η)( 1
θj + 1
2θk) < 3
2. To save some
space, below, I report only the Nash Equilibrium corruption levels. From these levels,
one can easily calculate equilibrium ﬁscal policy platforms as t∗




When p = 0, it is straightforward to show that s0










j(0) > 0 if and only if






j(0)) > 0 if and only if
w + η <
θkθj
2σ(θk + 2θj)
(3 + 2σ∆k). (9)
Thus,






k) if and only if (8) holds for at least
one j, and (9) holds for k 6= j.






2 , and k does not steal if and only if (8) holds
for j ∈ {1,2}, and (9) does not hold for k 6= j.
(iii) neither candidate steals if and only if (8) does not hold for any j ∈ {1,2}.


















2 } and sk is equal to
−1
2σ





[p(w + η + y) +
p
(w + η)p(w + η + y)]. (10)
Note that f
p
j (0) > 0 if and only if
(w + η)(1 − p) − py <





j (.)’s have an interior intersection only if (i) (11) holds for one j, and (ii) for




j (0)) > 0, that is,
(w + η)(1 − p) − py <
(θj − pv)(θk − pv)
2σ((θk − pv) + 2(θj − pv))
(3 + 2σ∆k) for k 6= j (12)
The game has a unique equilibrium either when (11) does not hold for any j (in
30which case both candidates stay honest), or when sk < 0 for both k ∈ {1,2} in which














The game may have multiple equilibria when sk > 0 for at least one candidate,
i.e., when there is a discontinuity in at least one candidate’s best response function.
When this is the case for both candidates, i.e. when (10) is larger than zero for both
j ∈ {1,2}, there are two possibilities:
(i) If (11) holds for some j ∈ {1,2} and (12) holds for k 6= j, then the number
of equilibria depends on whether (10) is less than (13) or not. There is a single
equilibrium (neither candidate steals) when (10) is larger than (13) for at least one j.
There are two equilibria (in one of the equilibria neither candidate steals, and in the
other each j steals the quantity given at (13)) when (10) is less than (13) for both j.
(ii) If (11) holds for some j ∈ {1,2}, but (12) does not hold for k 6= j, then in the
unique equilibrium none of the candidates steal.
The last possibility is that sk > 0 only for one k ∈ {1,2}. To make the presenta-
tion clearer assume, without loss of generality, that s1 > 0 and s2 6 0 (the analysis
for s2 > 0 and s1 6 0 is fully symmetric). Below, I write (13)j to mean (13) evaluated
for candidate j. First, note that if s2 < 0, then we have s
f
1(0) > 0. Second, we need
to check whether (12) holds for j = 2 or not:
(i) If (12) does not hold for j = 2, then, as we are studying the case in which










(ii) If (12) holds for j = 2, then the f
p
j (sk)’s have interior intersection. Then, we
need to check whether s1 ≤ s
f
1(0) or not. The game has a unique interior equilibrium








k) if and only if s1 ≤ s
f
1(0). When s1 >
s
f



















k) for j ∈ {1,2}
31Note that sk < 0 implies that s
p
j(0) > 0
31are both PSNE if and only if (13)2 ≥ s1,









2 = 0 if and
only if (13)2 < s1.
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